The XTR public key cryptosystem was introduced in 2000. XTR is suitable for a variety of environments including low-end smart cards, and is regarded as an excellent alternative to RSA and ECC. Moreover, it is remarked that XTR single exponentiation (XTR-SE) is less susceptible than usual exponentiation routines to environmental attacks such as the timing attack and the differential power analysis (DPA). This paper investigates the security of side channel attack (SCA) on XTR. In this paper, we show the immunity of XTR-SE against the simple power analysis if the order of the computation of XTR-SE is carefully considered. In addition, we show that XTR-SE is vulnerable to the data-bit DPA, the address-bit DPA, the doubling attack, the modified refined power analysis, and the modified zero-value attack. Moreover, we propose some countermeasures against these attacks. We also show experimental results of the efficiency of the countermeasures. From our implementation results, if we compare XTR with ECC with countermeasures against "SCAs," we think XTR is as suitable to smart cards as ECC. key words: XTR public key cryptosystem, side channel attacks, SPA, databit DPA, address-bit DPA, doubling attack, refined power analysis, zerovalue attack 
Introduction

Background
The XTR public key cryptosystem was presented at Crypto 2000 by Lenstra-Verheul, which is based on a traditional subgroup discrete logarithm system. XTR uses a nonstandard way to represent and compute subgroup elements to achieve computational and communicational advantages substantially over traditional representations. According to a result by Granger et al. [9] , when XTR is compared to CEILIDH, a newly proposed torus-based efficient public-key cryptosystem by Rubin-Silverberg [20] , CEILIDH seems inherently slower than XTR. Thus nowadays XTR is considered as the most efficient public key † † The author is with FUJITSU LABORATORIES Ltd., Kawasaki-shi, 211-8588 Japan.
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On the other hand, elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) are also suitable for a variety of environments including lowend smart cards and over-burdened web servers communicating with powerful PC clients. Although the key size of ECC can be somewhat further reduced than that of XTR, in many circumstances, for example storage, key sizes of ECC and XTR are comparable. Key generation for XTR is very fast compared to RSA, and orders of magnitude easier and faster than for ECC. As a result XTR can be regarded as an excellent alternative to RSA and ECC.
Moreover, Lenstra et al. remarked that XTR single exponentiation (XTR-SE), an algorithm included in XTR, is less susceptible than usual exponentiation routines to environmental attacks such as the timing attack and the differential power analysis (DPA) [16] , [21] , since XTR-SE has rather an unusual property that two computations (depending on m j = 0 or m j = 1) are very similar and take the same number of instructions. Thus, the instructions carried out in XTR-SE for the two different cases are very much alike in nature.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we investigate the security of side channel attack (SCA) on XTR single exponentiation [Algorithm 2.3.7, [16] ]. Especially, we consider following six SCA:
• simple power analysis (SPA) • data-bit differential power analysis (DDPA) [3] • address-bit differential power analysis (ADPA) [12] • doubling attack (DA) [7] • refined power analysis (RPA) [8] • zero-value attack (ZVA) [2] This paper shows that XTR-SE is immune against SPA without any countermeasure if the order of the computation is carefully considered. But we will show that XTR-SE is vulnerable to DDPA, ADPA, DA. We also show that XTR-SE can be also attacked by the modified refined power analysis (MRPA) and the modified zero-value attack (MZVA). The original ZVA on ECC utilizes zero values during the computation of addition formulas, and the updated elliptic points do not have zero values in their coordinates. However, MZVA on XTR uses zero values during XTR double operation formulas, and the updated elements have zero value. It's somewhat different from the original ZVA, and Moreover, we propose several countermeasures against SPA, DDPA, ADPA, DA, and MRPA/MZVA. From now on, throughout this paper, all SPA, DDPA, ADPA, DA, and MRPA/MZVA are just called as "SCAs" for simplicity. First, we introduce two well known countermeasures: exponent randomization and data randomization using field isomorphism. Also, we propose a countermeasure against ADPA by using random number. We propose one more countermeasure which uses the exponent splitting method with a random number. In XTR, the exponent splitting method could not be directly applied to XTR-SE because T r(g a ) * T r(g b ) is not equal to T r(g a+b ). Thus to apply the exponent splitting method to XTR-SE we utilize the property of XTR double exponentiation algorithm (XTR-DE). By using the property of XTR-DE we propose a randomized single exponentiation algorithm (XTR-RSE).
In addition, the proposed countermeasure is so efficient that the advantage of efficiency of XTR could be guaranteed. To compare the efficiency of the proposed countermeasure with ECC including "SCAs" countermeasures, we define two notions that are the efficiency decrease ratio (EDR) when "SCAs" countermeasures are added to cryptographic algorithm and the efficiency advantage ratio (EAR) when parallel process technique is used in the algorithm.
From the estimation of EDR and EAR, if we compare XTR with ECC with countermeasures against "SCAs," we think XTR is as suitable to smart cards as ECC.
Related Works
Some papers also deal with side channel attacks against XTR. In [4] , [19] , they applied SPA to XTR-SE using simultaneous XTR double exponentiation [Algorithm 3.1, [21] ]. Note these two papers consider only SPA on the target algorithm which is different from ours. Chung-Hasan [4] showed it takes 2 0.625 * k tries for an attacker until he/she correctly finds the secret value in the target algorithm where k is a bit-length of secret value. In [19] , Page-Stam showed it requires 2 0.55 * k tries, which is more improved than that of Chung-Hasan's. However, these results are far worse than well-known square-root type algorithms (Pollards' Rho methods).
XTR Public Key Cryptosystems
In this section, we review the mathematics of XTR including the basic parameters and the fundamental algorithms to calculate traces of powers [16] , [21] .
XTR uses a subgroup of prime order q of the order p 2 − p + 1 subgroup of F * p 6 . The latter group is referred to as the XTR supergroup and the order q subgroup g generated by g is referred to as the XTR group and denoted as G q . The reason that XTR uses this specific subgroup g is not just that it provides the full F * p 6 security, but also that the elements of the XTR supergroup, and thus of g , allow a very efficient representation, at a small cost.
For h ∈ F * p 6 its trace T r(h) over F p 2 is defined as the sum of the conjugates over F p 2 of h:
In XTR, elements of g are represented by their trace over F p 2 . Thus a representation of F p 2 is needed to allow efficient arithmetic operations, where p is prime such that p 2 − p + 1 has a sufficient large prime factor q. Suggested lengths to provide adequate levels of security are log 2 q ≈ 160 and log 2 p ≈ 170.
Let p be a prime that is 2 modulo 3. It follows that (X 3 − 1)/(X − 1) = X 2 + X + 1 is irreducible over F p and that the roots α and α p form an optimal normal basis for F p 2 over
it follows that
For the simplicity, we denote x = x 1 α + x 2 α 2 as (x 1 , x 2 ). Throughout this paper, c n denotes T r(g n ) ∈ F p 2 , for some fixed p and g of order q, where q divides
Corollary 1 ([16] , [21] ): Let c, c n−1 , c n and c n+1 be given.
XTR Single Exponentiation
In XTR, the algorithm to compute T r(g n ) given T r(g) and n ∈ Z is needed like the algorithm to compute g n in public key system based on discrete logarithm problem. We call this algorithm as XTR single exponentiation (XTR-SE).
Define following four functions: 
If n is even, n replace n − 1.
Let n = 2m + 1 and m = l j=0 m j 2 j with m j ∈ {0, 1} and m l = 1. 2. for j = l − 1 down to 0 2.1.
These functions are derived from Corollary 1. For instance, DBL[c n ] is a function which computes c 2n with input c n . It is calculated by using a formula c 2n = c Theorem 1 ([21] , cf. Sect. 2.4): Given the representation c ∈ F p 2 , the representation c n ∈ F p 2 can be computed in 7 log 2 n multiplications in F p , for any integer n.
In XTR-SE, the input c can be replaced by the trace c t : with c 1 = c t , S 1 ( c 1 ) = ( c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ) = (3, c t , c 2t ), and by the above theorem, the triple
Toy Example
Let n = 181. Then m = 90 = 2 6 + 2
. Given c and n, S 181 (c) could be computed as following Table 1 . Note that the notation t j is defined in Remark 1.
Parallel Implementation
XTR-SE can be implemented in parallel as DBLs and C u+v are independent.
As the computation of C u+v is slower than that of DBL, so that the latency of the loop in XTR-SE depends on the running time of C u+v . As p-th powering is free in XTR, we assume 
] is same. Let T C u+v denote the computation running time of C u+v , and T C 2n denote that of DBL. The total running time of XTR-SE with parallel process is T C 2n + (l + 2) · T C u+v . But the total running time of it without parallel process is (2l
Thus the improvement of XTR-SE with parallel process from XTR-SE without parallel process is (2l + 1) · DBL, i.e., when n is a 160-bit scalar the improvement is about 56.8%.
The parallelized XTR-SE requires total 7 registers and three functions such as two DBL and one C u+v .
• Step 1:
As
Step 2 is parallelized, following three functions are all requires, DBL, DBL, C u+v .
In the case of XTR-SE without parallelization, it requires only two functions, DBL and C u+v . Thus if parallelized XTR-SE is used then it utilizes 1.4 times space than XTR-SE without parallelization. Note the value 1.4 is calculated with the required number of multiplication in F p .
XTR Double Exponentiation Algorithm
In some protocol, e.g. at the verification step of NybergRueppel signatures, the product of two powers of g such as
, a, and b to compute g a+bk must be computed. Here, the integer k is secret information of a signer. For the standard representation that is straightforward, but if traces are used, then computing products is relatively complicated.
Let c ∈ F p 2 and S k (c) ∈ (F p 2 ) 3 be given for some secret integer k. In [16] , [21] , the algorithms that compute c a+bk efficiently for any a, b ∈ Z were proposed. We call these algorithms as XTR double exponentiation (XTR-DE). We introduce XTR-DE proposed in [16] . 
Remark 2:
In [16] , the cost is 8 log 2 (a/b mod q) + 8 log 2 (b) + 34 multiplications in F p . In this paper, we calculate the cost by using Lemma 2.2 in [21] .
XTR-ElGamal Encryption
XTR can be used in any cryptosystem that relies on the discrete logarithm problem. This section contains a description of a application of XTR to ElGamal encryption [16] .
Public key data of Alice: p, q, T r(g), T r(g k ). Secret key data of Alice
: k in [2, q − 3].
Encryption
Bob can encryption a message M ∈ F p 2 intended for Alice as follows.
1. Bob selects at random r ∈ [2, q − 3] and applies XTR-SE to n = r and c
Decryption
Using her knowledge of k, Alice decrypts the message (T r(g r ), E) as follows.
1. Alice applies XTR-SE to n = k and c = T r(g r ) to com-
Side Channel Attacks on XTR
In this section, we investigate the security of side channel attack on XTR-SE, especially SPA, data-bit DPA, addressbit DPA, doubling attack, refined power analysis, and zerovalue attack are considered.
Assumption: XTR-SE is operated in some XTR cryptosystem with public element c = T r(g) and a secret value n. An attacker want to detect the secret value n used in XTR-SE using side channel information.
XTR-SE is Secure against SPA
The computation of the XTR-SE requires the computations repeatedly that (DBL, DBL,
) depending on m j . As p-th powering is free, these two operations are indistinguishable from the observation of the power consumption. This means that the instructions performed during XTR-SE do not depend on the secret value being processed. Thus XTR-SE is resistant against SPA.
Caution:
Since DBLs and C u+v are independent, the order of computation is flexible. But the order of the computation is very important in the sense of SCA. For instance, assume that XTR-SE is implemented as following order DBL, DBL, and then C u+v if m j = 0, and C u+v , DBL, and then DBL if m j = 1. Then, the order of the computation can be easily known to an attacker by SPA. Thus, if the order of the computation of XTR-SE is not considered XTR-SE could not be any more secure against SPA.
Remark 3:
In step 3 in XTR-SE, a dummy C u+v operation is needed when n is odd. Otherwise the least significant bit of n, i.e., n is even or not, could be revealed.
Data-bit DPA on XTR-SE
In this section we describe a DDPA [3] against an implementation of XTR-SE. DDPA on XTR-SE can be performed by noticing that at step j the processed T [12] . This paper extends the analysis to XTR-SE. Since XTR-SE has similar structure to the Montgomery form elliptic curves, the analysis technic proposed by Itoh et al. could be applicable to XTR-SE.
ADPA [12] is successful if there is a close dependence between a secret value and addresses of accessed registers. Thus if we could find correlations between address value and secret value then XTR-SE is also vulnerable to ADPA.
Following property shows that there are correlations between address value and secret value m j in XTR-SE. • When m j = 1
From Property 1, ADPA [12] can be applied to XTR-SE. Thus XTR-SE is not any more secure against ADPA.
Doubling Attack on XTR-SE
In CHES 2003, Fouque et al. proposed the new attack against a classical implementation of the modular exponentiation or scalar multiplication in the ECC that only requires two queries to the device [7] .
The main idea of the doubling attack is based on the fact that, even if an attacker could not know which computation is done by the device, he/she could at least detect when the device does twice the same operation.
First, consider an example. This example is the same as that described in section 2.1.1. Then we compare the sequence of operations when XTR-SE is used to compute S 180 = (c 180 , c 181 , c 182 ) given c 1 and
From the Table 2 , we can see that DBL operation at j = 5, 2, and 0 to update C[0] in the computation S 181 is the same as the DBL operation at 6, 3, and 1 to update C[0] in the computation S 181 , respectively.
In XTR-SE, we can easily derive the following property. Therefore, with only two requests to the device, it is possible to recover all the bits of the secret value n.
Remark 4:
The doubling attack defeats two of the three countermeasures proposed by Coron [3] , which are randomization of the private exponent and randomization of the base element.
Modified Refined Power Analysis and Zero-Value Attack on XTR-SE
In this section, we consider refined power analysis (RPA) and Zero-value Point Attack on XTR-SE.
Goubin proposed refined power analysis on ECC [8] . To apply RPA to XTR we define a "Special element" c = T r(h) = (a 1 , a 2 ) , where a 1 , a 2 ∈ F p , if a 1 or a 2 is 0 (but not both 0) and h ∈ G q . Suppose XTR contains a "Special element" c = (a 1 , 0) or (0, a 2 ). We call it as Modified Refined power analysis (MRPA).
RPA is further generalized to Zero-value Point Attack (ZVA) [2] . To apply it to XTR, we consider following simple equation for DBL operation. For c = (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ F p 2 ,
We call it as the modified zero-value attack (MZVA). We investigate the MZVA for DBL operation. We search the zero-value elements in the following. We consider the input c given by c=c t −1 (mod q) . Then
In the case of MRPA: Let c be a special element (a 1 , 0). Then c t in the equation of (1) Therefore, if, in the power consumption curve, appreciable consumption "peaks" is found then m i = 0, otherwise m i = 1.
In the case of MZVA: Let c be a special element (a 1 , 2a 1 + 2). Then c t in the equation of (1) is (a 1 , 2a 1 + 2) . * If m i = 0, c 2t has the zero-value register as c 2t = (0, −3a 1 (a 1 + 2)). * If m i = 1, there is no zero-value register in ( c 2t+2 , c 2t+3 , c 2t+4 ) as c t (=c) only affect C 2n+1 and the output of it is influenced by four factors. Thus the probability that C 2n+1 has the zero-value register is approximately 1 2 log 2 p . Therefore, if we find a element c that takes the zerovalue register at DBL, we can use the input value c = c s −1 (mod q) for some integer s for this attack.
Numerical Examples of MRPA/MZVA
To give validity of MRPA/MZVA on XTR-SE, we show that XTR has some "special elements" and zero-value elements in XTR. In the following, the numerical data of "special elements" in XTR are listed. All data are described in hexadecimal. Note that log 2 q ≈ 160 and log 2 p ≈ 170.
Special elements for MRPA:
Special elements for MZVA:
Countermeasures
In this section, we propose three types of countermeasures: scalar randomization, data randomization, and address randomization. From this section, assume log 2 q = 160. The security of a countermeasure against each of SPA, DDPA, ADPA, DA, and MRPA/MZVA is measured by the Attenuation Ration (AR) [13] - [15] . We denote the ratio against SPA, DDPA, ADPA, DA, and MRPA/MZVA by AR S , AR DD , AR AD , AR DA , AR MR , and AR MZ . AR is a way to evaluate the security of countermeasures: all AR values are between 0 and 1, and are desired small. AR=0 implies the vulnerability to the attack, while AR=1 implies the resistance to the attack.
Scalar Randomization
Exponent Randomization
The randomized exponent methods [3] is well known countermeasure against DDPA.
The computation of S n =XTR-SE[c, n] is done by the following algorithm:
1. Select a random number r in [1, q] .
, where c = T r(g). ( * ) : as order of g is prime q.
In the original paper, the length of r is 20-bit, but 20-bit randomization is controversial [7] , [18] . So, we extend the size to 160-bit. Then the required computing times become at least 2 times than that of without countermeasure. We obtain following security reports:
, and AR MZ = 2 −160 .
• DA case: When c 1 and c 2 are inputted into XTR-RSE r is randomly selected in each case. Thus the probability that DA succeeds is 1 2 √ log 2 (q) due to the birthday paradox, i.e., the probability that two selected random numbers are equal is . In general, suggested length to provide adequate levels of security is log 2 (q) ≈ 160. Therefore, the success probability of DA,
• MRPA/MZVA cases: To use MRPA/MZVA the attacker inputs c = c t −1 (mod q) . Here, c is "Special element" or zero-value element. But in XTR the attacker can not guess the value of t because the value of r is randomly selected at every execution. Thus AR MR =AR MZ = 2 −160 .
Exponent Splitting
Exponent splitting method proposed by Clavier-Joye [5] , in which an exponentiation g n is computed by (g r ) * (g n−r ) for a random integer r.
In XTR, the exponent splitting method could not be directly applied to XTR-SE because c r * c n−r c n . Thus to apply the exponent splitting method to XTR-SE we use the property of XTR-DE. By using Property 3, we propose a randomized XTR single exponentiation (XTR-RSE) that is a modification of XTR-DE with a random number. If XTR-DE is used to compute c n with c and n (described in Property 3), the cost of computing c n could be changed depending on the size of log 2 (b). Thus if b is selected as the size of log 2 (b) is small then the total cost 7 log 2 (a/b mod q) + 7 log 2 (b) + 36 (multiplications in F p ) could be also reduced depending on the size of log 2 (b).
But it's open problem that when the size of b which is randomly selected in XTR-RSE is reduced less than log 2 (q), for example, if log 2 (b) = 20, is XTR-RSE immune against "SCAs"?
Remark 5: XTR-DE [Algorithm 2.5, [21] ] could be also modified as XTR-SE with the same way described in Property 3. But there is one different aspect that is the efficiency. The cost of XTR-DE [Algorithm 2.5, [21] ] is 14 log 2 q multiplications in F p and this result is not changed, i.e., the efficiency is independent on the choice of a, b.
Data Randomization
To randomize computing objects, we use field isomorphism. As p ≡ 2 mod 3, the zeros α and α p of the polynomial (X 3 −1)/(X−1) = X 2 +X+1 form an optimal normal basis for Let n = 2m + 1 and m = l j=0 m j 2 j with m j ∈ {0, 1} and m l = 1. 2. for j = l − 1 down to 0 2.1.
If n is odd then return ( 
Thus we obtain another representation for the element x using the roots of X 2 + a 1 X + a 0 . The efficiency of the countermeasure depends on the choice of the irreducible polynomial X 2 + a 1 X + a 0 and basis. To speed up XTR-SE x 2 , xy, x p , xz − yz p for x, y, z ∈ F p 2 should be efficient because these operations play an important role in XTR-SE. However, the original XTR is optimized by using optimal normal basis so that if we select random irreducible polynomial then the efficiency of XTR can't be guaranteed.
The security reports are as follows: AR S = 0, AR DD = 2 −160 , AR AD = 1, AR DA = 2 −160 , AR MR = 1, and AR MZ = 2 −160 .
Address Randomization
Address-bit DPA is based on the relation between a secret value and addresses of the accessed registers. In order to resist ADPA, this relation should be hidden. We use random number r l−1 2 l−1 + · · · + r 1 2 + r 0 where r i ∈ {0, 1}. Define [a] 3 denote remainder of a modulo 3 for any a ∈ Z. For example, [5] 
Goal : Remove the relations described in Property 1. If we could obtain following relations in XTR-SE, ADPA is infeasible to XTR-SE.
• When m j = 0 and r j = 0,
• When m j = 0 and r j = 1,
• When m j = 1 and r j = 0,
• When m j = 1 and r j = 1,
We propose XTR-SE with countermeasure against DDPA which satisfies above relations.
The proposed countermeasure has almost no overhead for the protection, i.e., the processing speed is no slower than that without the countermeasure.
The security reports are as follows: AR S = 0, AR DP = 1, AR AP = 1, AR DA = 1, AR MR = 1, and AR MZ = 1. Table 3 shows the sum-up of security report for countermeasures against "SCAs" and processing speed of a XTR-SE which is measured by the numbers of multiplications in F p . Let N M be the number of multiplications required in XTR-SE without "SCAs" countermeasures. If a countermeasure requires h times multiplications than before, we denote it as ×h. The question symbol in Table 3 implies that the efficiency depends on the choice of irreducible polynomial and basis. For example, if randomly selected irreducible polynomial and polynomial basis are used then N M is roughly ×129.
Security and Efficiency
Comparison between XTR and ECC
In this section, we compare the efficiency with countermeasures against "SCAs" between XTR and ECC. Assume that K = F p (p > 3) be a finite field with p elements, say p is 160-bit prime. For a given elliptic curve E(K) and two points P 1 , P 2 ∈ E(K), denote a pointaddition of P 1 and P 2 as ECADD(P 1 , P 2 ) when P 1 P 2 and as ECDBL(P 1 ) if P 1 = P 2 .
To compare XTR with ECC, we consider two wellknown scalar multiplication methods such as the ordinary binary scalar multiplication from the least significant bit (BM LSB) and the addition-double always binary scalar multiplication from the least significant bit (ADA BM LSB).
Itoh et al. [13] , [14] recommended that the best combination countermeasure against SPA, DDPA, and ADPA from the security level and processing speed. To defeat DA we use ADA BM LSB as no attack as efficient as the DA is known on ADA BM LSB in ECC. For RPA and ZVA, we use the point blinding method [1] , [3] .
There exist several ways to represent a point. The efficiency of computing ECADD and ECDBL depends on the representation of the coordinate system. In [6] , the more detailed explanation of coordinate system is contained. The main coordinate systems are categorized as follows: Affine coordinate system (A), Projective coordinate system (P), Jacobian coordinate system (J), Chudonovsky coordinate system (J c ), and Modified Jacobian coordinate system (J m ). Table 4 shows the number of multiplications in the base field depending on the given conditions. Note that numbers in Table 4 are the estimation for 1S=0.8M, 1I=30M, where M, S, and I denote the computation time of a multiplication, a squaring, and an inverse in the definition field K, respectively. Let l be the length of the secret value of k. Note that in Table 4 we only consider XTR-RSE as a countermeasure against "SCAs." The security and efficiency of exponent randomization method is same to it.
In general, if "SCAs" countermeasures are added to cryptographic algorithm then the efficiency decreases. From Table 4 , we estimate the efficiency decrease ratio (EDR) as EDR = Y 1 −X 1 X 1 * 100 (%). Here, X 1 and Y 1 denote the required number of multiplications over base field to compute basic algorithm such as XTR-SE or scalar multiplication without "SCAs" countermeasures and that to compute basic algorithm with them, respectively. The average of EDR for ECC without parallel process is 46.4% and with parallel process is 24.4%. On the other hand, the average of EDR for XTR without parallel process is 103.2% and with parallel process is 107.4%. Thus the efficiency decrease ratio for ECC is smaller than that for XTR.
We also estimate the advantage of efficiency which is obtained when parallel process is used. Define efficiency advantage ratio (EAR) as EAR = X 2 −Y 2 X 2 * 100 (%). Here, X 2 and Y 2 denote the required number of multiplication over base field to compute basic algorithm without parallel process and that to compute basic algorithm with parallel process, respectively. The average of EAR for ADA BM LSB with "SCAs" countermeasures is 37.5%. On the other hand, the average of EAR for XTR-RSE is 55.5%. Thus the efficiency advantage ratio for XTR is larger than that for ECC.
From the estimation of EDR and EAR, if we compare XTR with ECC with countermeasures against "SCAs," we think XTR is as suitable to smart cards as ECC due to the efficiency of the proposed XTR-RSE. 
